(with Philipp Heller, Dorothea Kübler, and Morimitsu Kurino)
Abstract: Allocating appointment slots is presented as a new application for market design. We consider online booking systems that are commonly used by public authorities to allocate appointments for driver’s licenses, visa interviews, passport renewals, etc. We document that black markets for appointments have developed in many parts of the world. Scalpers book the appointments that are offered for free and sell the slots to appointment seekers. We model the existing first-come-first-served booking system and propose an alternative system. The alternative system collects applications for slots for a certain time period and then randomly allocates slots to applicants. We investigate the two systems under conditions of low and high demand for slots. The theory predicts and lab experiments confirm that scalpers profitably book and sell slots under the current system with high demand, but that they are not active in the proposed new system under both demand conditions.
(with Dorothea Kübler)
Abstract: The paper surveys the experimental literature on matching markets. It covers house allocation, school choice, and two-sided matching markets such as college admissions. The main focus of the survey is on truth-telling and strategic manipulations by the agents, on the stability and efficiency of the matching outcome, as well as on the distribution of utility.
Abstract: Previous studies of charitable giving have focused on middle or higher income earners in Western countries, neglecting the poor. Despite this focus, the lowest income groups are often shown to contribute substantial shares of their income to charitable causes. In a large-scale natural field experiment with over 180,000 clients of a micro-lending company in Kyrgyzstan, we study charitable giving by a population that is much poorer relative to the typical donors that have been studied so far. In a 2x2 design, we explore two main hypotheses about giving by the poor: (i) that they are more price sensitive and (ii) that they care about their proximity to the charitable project. We find evidence in favor of the former hypothesis but not of the latter.
(with Maja Adena and Seffen Huck)
Abstract: We conduct a field experiment with 302 workers of the microcredit company in Russia to study the effects of the different designs of a contest for monetary prizes at the workplace. We consider a standard all-pay auction design with two and four prizes of different size and compare it to “parallel” contests with the same prizes, but where participants have to choose the prize prior to the start of the competition and then the winner is selected only among the players who chose the same prize. Despite the theoretical predictions, the parallel contests lead to higher efforts for all players, but mainly by lower-ability players. Division of prizes leads to the predicted effects. In parallel contests, too many players choose the higher prize than equilibrium suggests. Overall, the parallel version of contests appeared to be more profitable for the firm.
(with Inacio Bo)
Abstract: The last few years have seen an increasing use of sequential online mechanisms, instead of the traditional direct counterparts, in college admissions in countries such as Germany, Brazil, and China. We describe those, and identify shortcomings in terms of incentives and outcome properties they have. We introduce a new family of mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, which improve upon these shortcomings. Unlike most mechanisms available in the literature, which ask students for a full preference ranking over all colleges, they are instead sequentially asked to make choices or submit partial rankings from sets of colleges. These are used to produce, in each step, a tentative allocation. If at some point it is determined that a student cannot be accepted into a college anymore, then she is asked to make another choice among those which would tentatively accept her. Participants following the simple strategy of choosing the most preferred college in each step is a robust equilibrium that yields the Student Optimal Stable Matching.
(with Inacio Bo)
Transparency of centralised allocation mechanisms
Information acquisition in centralised college admissions
(with Dorothea Kübler and Siqi Pan)
Parallel markets in school choice: An experimental study
(with Bertan Turhan and Piotr Evdokimov)
Overconfidence of CEOs and founders and the performance of start-ups.
(with Annamaria Conti)